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Abstract 
We analyzed the distribution of the result of Indonesian 1999 and 2004 legislative 
election in order to have the statistical properties or any stylized facts. The paper shows 
that the analysis results the power-law signature persistently in the election of the House 
of Representative in 1999 and 2004 and more clearly in the result of Regional 
Representative Council that held for the first time in 2004. It shows that the socio-
political system is a complex system constituted by interacting citizens and accentuates 
universality that the social evolution dynamically turns to be self-organized in critical 
state. 
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It's not the voting that's democracy; it's the counting. 
Tom Stoppard, Jumpers 
 
1. Background 
Interval the year 1999 to 2004 is the period of social and political reform in Indonesia. 
The General Election 1999 is believed to be the first fair election in Indonesia after 
escaping from 32 years of dictatorship regime. There are 48 political parties joined the 
election for DPR (House of Representatives) and DPRD I & II (regional and city 
councils). In 2004, the political reform has urged to change the rule of political system 
including the election system. The political system has changed to be the bicameralism 
system while General Election is held in order to let citizens choose directly the members 
of DPR (House of Representatives), DPRD I & II (city councils) and DPD (the Regional 
Representative Council). Directly is by means of choose not only from the collection of 
political parties but choose directly the individuals to be seated in certain political 
insitutions. It is obvious that the election 2004 become a hope for a better political 
system in Indonesia. 
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The aim of the paper is to show the changes of statistical properties of the General 
Election 1999 and 2004 as the voting system changes. We will concern with the 
legislative election since the direct voting for executive power (presidency) occurs for the 
first time in 2004, thus we do not have yet any reference to be compared with. In short, 
the paper will try to answer the question how the socio-political changes as reflected by 
the statistical properties of the election result happens on the changes of election rule.  
 
As we know from previous works (Situngkir, 2003), political system as we perceived is 
came out as emergent phenomena from the interacting citizens. Thus, the election result 
analyzed by using statistics is the facts comes out from interacting political agents vote 
for aggregate new political system. This is the main idea of social complexity: to look for 
the pattern of the emergent phenomena from interacting agents. Eventually, we find that 
the distributional pattern follows the power-law distribution that indicates the character 
of self-organized in critical condition as the threshold to the chaotic regime (Schuster, 
1995:70-72).  
 
We use election result data that accessible from the web-site of General Election 
Comission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2004). We choose several regional (based on 
provice) election result, i.e.: Province of Aceh, Province of Sumatera Utara, Province of 
Sumatera Barat, Province of Sumatera Selatan, Province of Lampung, Province of Jambi, 
Province of Bengkulu, Province of Riau, Province of Jakarta, Province of Yogyakarta, 
Province of Nusa Tenggara Barat and Timur as sample of the whole nation-wide election 
districts. In the other hand, we use the result of the election for DPD (Regional 
Representative Council) of 2004 election result that taken from all of the election 
districts. We normalized the votes of each parties and candidates concerning the majority 
votes of each region and group all of the result of each district in the double-logarithmic 
plot to see the distribution of votes. We note that we are not dealing with who the 
winner of the election and the structural political pattern emerges from it, since it will be 
analyzed in other research paper. What we concern mostly  about in the paper is the 
social analysis as reflected from the data.  
 
 
2. Statistical Model  
Let us assume that each candidate has normal distribution of their ability to persuade 
voters to choose her, denoted by probability c; while p(c) is the probability density of 
persuasion ability equals to c.  
 
We can write,  
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where µ  and σ  are mean and standard deviation respectively of the distribution of c.  
Next, we can say that )(cfi  as pre-election campaign i-th process, while then  
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and so on up to many pre-election processes, while the average votes gained by candidate 
in n-th subprocess is 
 
nn ccccf ...)( 21=     (4) 
 
The total votes gained by candidates are then can be assumed as the multiplicative 
process since the total votes gained by candidate eventually in the election after large 
amount of n is 
 
nn ccccfv ...)( 21==     (5) 
 
While v denotes the total votes for candidates in the ballot, and N(v) as the number of 
candidates that received the fraction votes v, we can have the histogram of N(v) vs v as 
the statistical distribution of the whole voting process. This explanation was also 
proposed by Filho, et. al. (2002) on finding the power-law characteristic in Brazilian 
election.  
 
It is very interesting that the histogram resulted (N(v) vs v) is not a gaussian one but a 
power-law characters showing that the election result is somehow a self-organized and 
critical social conditions. For the election of the member of Regional Representative 
Council (DPD: Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) that elected for the first time in 2004, the 
distribution of the number of candidates N receiving fraction of votes v followed a 
power-law αvvN ~)(  with fitted 1≈α . This fact can be seen in figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the other hand, the result of election for House of Representatives is also power-law 
but with approximated exponent lower than 1. The signature of the power-law 
distribution is not only seen in the result of 2004 election but also in the previous (1999) 
-1.0 
Figure 1 
The double-log histogram of the result of DPD (Regional Representative Council) 2004 election.  
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one. The difference of statistical facts between election 1999 and 2004 is only about 
other coefficient of the distribution equation. As described in fgure 2, it is clear that the 
the fitting power distribution of 2004 election is laid above the 1999 one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Discussions 
In general, the power law distribution can be written as 
 
α−≈ CvvN )(     (6) 
  
or in double-logarithmic form 
 
vCvN loglog)(log α−≈   (7) 
 
hence we have a straight line fit in the double-log scales. Statistically, this means that 
 
α−= vvVPr ~][    (8) 
 
the probability of a candidate gains v votes equals to α−v , and in this specific case, the 
exponent goes around the unity ( 1≈α ), as described in the previous work (Situngkir & 
Surya, 2003).  
 
An important lesson we can get from this fact is that social dynamics representing by the 
the statistical properties of election result are a self-organized criticallity. Every system 
(including social system) will be persistently evolve towards the critical state. The critical 
state is signatured by the response functions depict no characteristic scales (Bak, 1997). 
The power-law distribution is scale-free, means that the character of the critical system 
does not depend upon time and distance. A sign that showed the robust character of 
critical state, specifically in social system. 
 
-0.64 
Figure 2 
The power-law signature in the election result for DPR (House of Representative ) in 1999 and 
2004.  
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This is somehow interesting and revealed by the result of general election for DPR (the 
house of representatives) in Indonesia held in 1999 and in 2004. By no concerning about 
who wins in the elections, we can see that the the exponent coefficients (α ) in the two 
respective years are not changed, but the normalization coefficient (figure 2). This shows 
that the pattern of the election process is just the same in the two different years, despite 
there are major changes in the rule of voting used in the elections, as being explained 
above. This is also relating to the result of well-known voting model, e.g.: Snzajd model, 
that shows how a favorite candidate or party tends to become majority from minority by 
the behavior of voters to choose candidate or party that mostly chosen in their social 
network (bahera & Schweitzer, 2003). Free from the economic, socio-political condition 
and the most popular candidate or party, the pattern tends to be persistent in the critical 
state. Nonetheless, it is surprising that the changes in the rule of election in 1999 and 
2004 does not change the pattern.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We show that there is power-law pattern in the distribution of number of votes gained in 
Indonesian election results persistently in the 1999 and 2004 election. This pattern is 
interpreted as the social robustness in Indonesian political system since the major 
changes in the election mechanism in 1999 and 2004 are not reflected in the statistical 
properties of the result. This can also mean that the election as perceived by the citizens 
is the same from the year 1999 and 2004 despite the changes. Moreover, analytically we 
can say that the power-law indicates and accentuates of the universality of social 
evolution that is persistently around the characters of the self-organized in critical state.  
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